Persuasion under “Aspect-Restricted” Experimentation

Antonio Jiménez Martínez, Profesor Investigador Titular de la División de Economía, escribió Persuasion under “Aspect-Restricted” Experimentation.



This article explores information design in two-aspect-uncertainty environments under the assumption that the Sender is (exogenously) restricted to choosing only one
of the aspects to design experiments over it. The equilibrium concept used incorporates a “backwards-induction” requirement (for the initial aspect choice) to the Bayes–correlated equilibrium notion typically used in the information design literature. Optimal experimentation is driven by the marginal priors over the separate aspects, the
joint priors about the state, and the players’ preferences. Through the new information it discloses, optimal experimentation seeks to alleviate the original conflict of interests. For the two-action case, the optimal aspect choice and any optimal experiment are “tailor-designed” according to the preferences of the Receiver. The results provide a rationale for Senders deliberately selecting aspects in order to meet Receivers’ tastes when they are constrained to selecting subsets of aspects from all the relevant aspects.


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